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FEDERALISM AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:
IMPLEMENTING THE HAGUE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION
IN THE UNITED STATES
Stephen B. Burbank†
ABSTRACT
Federalism is important in the United States. It is also important that the United States
be able to participate effectively in a global economy and that those charged with the conduct
of the country’s foreign affairs be able to make, and that the country abide by, international
agreements that are designed to facilitate transnational commercial activity. The Hague
Choice of Court Convention is one such agreement, the modest fruits of more than a decade of
work in an international lawmaking effort that was initiated by the United States. However
modest the fruits of the enterprise, the rest of the world is watching to see whether the United
States ratifies, and how it implements, the Hague Convention.
Effective dispute resolution processes are critical to a well-functioning global economy,
and effectiveness for this purpose requires, just as it does for a national or regional economy,
generous recognition and enforcement of judgments. Key to such generosity, in turn, are
acceptable jurisdiction standards and, experience has demonstrated, reciprocity. Finally,
mutual assurance that reciprocity will in fact be forthcoming requires very considerable
uniformity and certainty in the governing legal rules.
The Hague Convention leaves little room for variation or departure in standards for
asserting jurisdiction or recognizing and enforcing judgments. Although there are good
reasons to implement the treaty through legislation, the proposal that the uniform state law
process be used for that purpose is not well considered. The history of domestic regulation
does not provide strong normative support for state law to furnish the rules for jurisdiction
and judgment recognition in international cases. Harmonization with abutting or intersecting
state law norms, which is a legitimate concern in thinking about international private
lawmaking on many subjects, is not generally a concern in connection with the law governing
jurisdiction and judgment recognition. The Hague Convention appears to be an exception to
that generalization with respect to jurisdiction, because choice of court clauses implicate
contract law. Experience in the arbitration field suggests, however, that an attempt to
harmonize would be a mistake, and the relevant state contract law is in any event
underdeveloped and not uniform. Finally, federal implementation through legislation
prescribing federal law that is mostly uniform, but a few provisions of which may borrow
designated state law, would impose lower transaction and administrability costs, with no loss
of accessibility, than would state implementation.
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I. Introduction
A number of recent lawmaking initiatives, international and domestic, have put in
focus questions concerning the roles that international, federal and state law can and should
play as sources of authority and sources of rules in the United States for exercises of
jurisdiction, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments, in international cases. In this
article, I explore a subset of those questions by considering the domestic process that should
be used to implement, and the domestic law that should be used to supplement, the Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (the “Hague Convention”).1 In particular, I
examine (1) the appropriateness and feasibility of a process that relies, in whole or part, on the
states of the United States for this treaty’s implementation, and (2) the appropriate relationship
between federal and state law in filling its interstices, whatever implementation process is
selected. I also hope to cast light on the choice between federal law (of the sort recently
recommended by the American Law Institute)2 and state law (of the sort recently
recommended by the Uniform Law Commissioners)3 for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign-country judgments that are not covered by the Hague Convention.
The Hague Convention represents the modest but potentially useful remains of an
ambitious effort, initiated by the United States in the early 1990's, that sought to craft a
multilateral treaty providing the rules for jurisdiction and judgment recognition and
enforcement in civil cases. The United States was concerned that, although foreign-country
judgments were very liberally recognized and enforced here, American judgments did not
receive a similar reception abroad. Our delegation also sought to solve the problem of
discriminatory treatment of Americans in litigation abroad through foreign judgments based on

© Stephen B. Burbank 2006
† David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania
Law School. A preliminary version of this article was presented to the Conflict of Laws
Section of the Association of American Law Schools in January 2006. Samuel Baumgartner,
Kevin Clermont, Louis Pollak, Curtis Reitz, and Peter Trooboff provided helpful comments on
a draft, and the author profited from discussions with Bill Woodward about the role of contract
law in the enforcement of choice of forum clauses. Jie Yuan, Penn Law Class of 2006,
provided excellent research assistance.
¹ Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, concluded June 30, 2005 [hereinafter
Hague Convention], http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=98. For
recent commentary on the background and provisions of the Hague Convention, see Louise
Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and
Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543 (2005).
2
See RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (Proposed Final Draft 2005) [hereinafter ALI PROJECT].
3
See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005).
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grounds of jurisdiction that were avowedly exorbitant when deployed against others. The
prospects for such treatment had increased with the expanding reach of provisions in the
Brussels Convention authorizing, and requiring the recognition of judgments founded on, it.4
The effort to conclude a global jurisdiction and judgments convention foundered, in
part, on the lack of a credible quid pro quo. Negotiators from the rest of the world perceived
that they had little to gain in the area of judgment recognition and enforcement as a result of
unilateral American generosity.5 They therefore viewed the negotiations as an opportunity to
proscribe as exorbitant in international cases jurisdictional grounds – including general doing
business jurisdiction -- that American negotiators, aware of opposition at home, were
unwilling to surrender.6
4

See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague
Convention, and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 232 (2001) [hereinafter
Jurisdictional Equilibration]; Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: Sources of
Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 1551, 1572-73 (1992) [hereinafter Federal
Judgments Law]; Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 278-79
(Summer 1994).
5
The problem with unilateral generosity is that it may weaken U.S.
bargaining power when, other countries having chosen not to
follow our example, it attempts to work out mutually acceptable
agreements. That looms as a difficulty for the United States in
pursuing a multilateral convention on the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for International Civil
Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 138-39 (Summer 1994) (footnotes omitted). For
a discussion of the issues, see SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION
ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 6-9 (2003).
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See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning
of the Millennium?, 7 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 119 (1999); Linda J. Silberman, Can
the Hague Judgments Project Be Saved?: A Perspective from the United States, in A GLOBAL
LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 177 (John J. Barceló III &
Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002); Linda J. Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the
International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 319 (2002). Other obstacles included “the force of constitutional change in
Europe – the shift of competence from European Union member states to the European
Community in Brussels – and the rise of the Internet economy and the resulting uncertainties
caused by new business models, changing technology, and new commercial players.” Jeffrey
D. Kovar, In Memoriam: Arthur T. Von Mehren, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1952, 1953 (2006). See
also Ronald A. Brand, The 1999 Hague Preliminary Draft Convention Text on Jurisdiction

3

To the credit of negotiators on both sides of these issues, rather than giving up, they
moderated their ambitions and worked out a treaty providing both uniform jurisdiction and
recognition and enforcement standards for the adjudication of business-to-business disputes
governed by exclusive choice of court clauses. The goal of this treaty is “to promote
international trade and investment through enhanced judicial co-operation,” and the chosen
method is “an international legal regime that provides certainty and ensures the effectiveness
of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to commercial transactions and that
governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments resulting from proceedings based on
such agreements.”7
II. Is Implementing Legislation Necessary or Appropriate?
It is for each country to determine the domestic processes appropriate (1) to reach a
decision whether to ratify the Hague Convention and (2) if ratified, to implement it.8 On the

and Judgments: A View from the United States, 40 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE, Jan.-Mar. 2004, at 31, 31-32, 35.
7

Hague Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. Since the die was cast in favor of prescribing
standards for both jurisdiction and judgment recognition in the Brussels Convention of 1968,
and given the role that jurisdictional anxiety played in sabotaging the effort to reach a simple
judgments treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom in the ensuing decade, it
has long been clear that successful international lawmaking on foreign-country judgment
recognition and enforcement standards also requires agreement on international jurisdiction
standards. The hope of the United States in the recently concluded initiative at The Hague was
that the jurisdictional diversity necessarily implicated in a global treaty would permit
successful negotiation of an instrument that departed from the Brussels model of a double
convention by carving out some unregulated jurisdictional space in which Contracting States
would be free to continue to operate under national jurisdiction and recognition law. See von
Mehren, supra note 4. Both the pull of the Brussels model and the negotiating incentives and
ambitions of other countries dashed that hope, but the history helps to understand the
importance of both sets of provisions in the Hague Convention and the importance of uniform
adherence to them by Contracting States.
8

In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the
United States to decide how it will carry out its international
obligations. Accordingly, the intention of the United States
determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the
United States or should await implementation by legislation or
appropriate executive or administrative action.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111, cmt. h
(1987).
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assumption that ratification will not be controversial,9 the first major choice for the United
States would seem to be between viewing the treaty as self-executing, in which event it would
require only Senate consent to become binding domestic law (once ratified and entering into
force internationally), or as non-self-executing and thus also requiring implementing
legislation.
The provisions of the Hague Convention appear to call for judicial enforcement, the
hallmark of a self-executing treaty that directly preempts state law under the Supremacy
Clause.10 Nor would the treaty “achieve what lies within the exclusive law-making power of
Congress under the Constitution.”11 Pointing in the other direction is the fact that a multilateral
treaty may be less likely to yield a domestic interpretation that it is self-executing than a
bilateral treaty.12 In any event, politics can trump general principles of treaty interpretation,
and both the Senate, in giving consent to a treaty, and the Congress by resolution have claimed
the power to require implementing legislation.13 Moreover, politics aside, the Hague
Convention contains at least two pegs on which to hang arguments for implementing
legislation, and some such legislation appears warranted in any event.
The Hague Convention specifically adverts to problems that may arise in, or as a result
of, “non-unified legal systems.” Thus, Article 28 permits a State to declare at the time of
ratification “that the Convention shall extend to all its territorial units or only to one or more of

9

This assumption might prove false if the analytically distinct issue of the mode of
implementation proved controversial and if either the Senate or the Executive Branch chose to
link consent/ratification and implementation.
10
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution
declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded
in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it
operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the
terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages
to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it
can become a rule for the Court.
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
11
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 111 cmt. i.
12
See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832
(1979). But see Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 708 (1995) (criticizing Postal). As Professor Vasquez notes, “it is well
accepted that some provisions of a treaty may be self-executing while others are not.” Id. at
709 (footnote omitted).
13

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 111 (4)(b). These claims are not
uncontroversial. See Vasquez, supra note 12, at 704-10.
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them,” and to “modify this declaration by submitting another declaration at any time.”14 This
provision appears to be designed primarily for countries like Canada which lack constitutional
power to bind their constituent states, but it could be adduced in the United States (which is
not so disabled) as evidence of the acceptability, at least internationally, of ratification for less
than the whole country through some process permitting state choice.
In addition, Article 25 of the Hague Convention seeks to accommodate the existence of
“two or more systems of law apply[ing] in different territorial units with regard to any matter
dealt with in this Convention” by affording freedom, where “appropriate,” to interpret
references to (1) “the law or procedure of a State,” (2) “residence in a State,” (3) “the court or
courts of a State,” and (4) “a connection with a State” as references to the “relevant territorial
unit.”15 This provision would be germane in the United States even if the Hague Convention
were regarded as a self-executing treaty. Opponents of self-executing treaties may, however,
seize on the observation in the drafting history that implementing legislation could be used to
provide “how ‘appropriate’ is to be understood” in Article 25.16
Whatever the effect of such provisions under United States treaty law, the Hague
Convention undoubtedly presents a number of issues as to which, in the absence of
implementing legislation, uncertainty is predictable, both here and abroad, about the governing
law in the United States. An ex ante specification of the governing law for such issues is
desirable both to reduce transaction costs and to promote the treaty’s goals of certainty and
uniformity. Thus, Article 5 confers jurisdiction pursuant to an exclusive choice of court
agreement “unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State,”17 while Article 6
obligates courts of other Contracting States to suspend or dismiss proceedings unless, among
other exceptions, “the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen
court,” “a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of the State of the
court seised,” or “giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seised.”18 The uncertainty that,
for example, would attend an unguided determination by contracting parties or by a U.S. court
under Article 5 whether the choice of a U.S. forum would be or was “null and void under the
14

Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 28. Cf. id. art. 33 (providing that denunciations
“may be limited to certain territorial units of a non-unified legal system to which this
convention applies”).
15
Id. art. 25.
16
MASATO DOGAUCHI & TREVOR C. HARTLEY, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L
LAW, PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS:
DRAFT REPORT, PREL. DOC. NO. 26, at 47 n. 222 (2004), available at
http:www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd26e.pdf. The comment perhaps reflected awareness
that some countries with non-unified legal systems would have to put the treaty into effect by
legislation, not the view that implementing legislation would be appropriate for all such
countries.
17
Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
18
Id. art. 6(a)-(c).
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law of that State” probably pales in comparison with the uncertainty that would attend
unguided determinations of that question by the courts of other Contracting States under
Article 6.
Similarly, under Article 9's exceptions to the duty to recognize and enforce judgments,
questions will predictably arise whether (1) “the agreement was null and void under the law of
the State of the chosen court,”19 (2) “a party lacked capacity to conclude the agreement under
the law of the requested State,”20 (3) service was effected “in a manner that is incompatible
with fundamental principles of the requested State,”21 and (4) “recognition or enforcement
would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, including
situations where the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State.”22 Neither contracting parties and
disputants nor domestic and foreign courts should be left at sea concerning the U.S. law that
provides the answers to those questions.
In addition, the Hague Convention permits Contracting States to make a number of
choices that may be relevant in domestic decisions regarding implementation and the
governing law and that should be made accessible in legislation. For example, the treaty
enables Contracting States to opt out of the default rule that requires documents “be
accompanied by a certified translation into an official language” by providing otherwise in
domestic law.23 More important, it affords Contracting States the ability to make a number of
declarations, including declarations preserving the ability to refuse to exercise jurisdiction
when “there is no connection between that State and the parties or the dispute,”24 and to refuse
to recognize or enforce judgments “if the parties were resident in the requested State, and the
relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute ... were connected only
with the requested State.”25 Contracting States are also empowered to declare that they will not
apply the Hague Convention to specific matters, “clearly and precisely defined,” in which they
have a strong interest in remaining free of the treaty’s obligations.26 Finally, the treaty confers
the power to bring within the reach of its provisions on recognition and enforcement, by
reciprocal declarations, judgments given by courts designated in non-exclusive choice of court
agreements, in certain circumstances.27 Each of these choices requires careful study by the
United States. Knowledge of the decisions made with respect to them should not require
research in international legal materials, and such research would not in any event reveal the

19

Id. art. 9(a).
Id. art. 9(b).
21
Id. art. 9(c)(ii).
22
Id. art. 9(e).
23
Id. art. 13(4).
24
Id. art. 19.
25
Id. art. 20.
26
Id. art. 21.
27
See id. art. 22.
20
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reasons for those decisions. Legislation and legislative history appear to be the best vehicles
for informing courts and parties on these subjects.
III. The Arguments for Implementation through Uniform State Law
The prospect of legislation to implement the Hague Convention in the United States,
whether or not such legislation is required, has already led some to call for a process that
makes use of state law in general, and of uniform state law in particular, for that purpose. In a
recently published article, my colleague, Professor Curtis Reitz, then chair of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’ International Legal Developments
Committee, explores various possible intersections between state law and treaty law.28 While
noting an unanswered domestic constitutional question surrounding use of the “Canada clause”
to permit state governments “to decide whether or not to implement a convention,”29 Professor
Reitz champions the use of uniform state law rather than (or, where necessary, in addition to)
federal legislation for the purpose of implementing non-self-executing treaties.30
Central to this argument is the view that, in areas that for domestic purposes are
traditionally governed by state law, the United States should, when appropriate, seek “soft
law” rather than “hard law” in the treaties it negotiates,31 eschew self-executing treaties (by
their nature federal law that preempts inconsistent state law),32 and rely on the uniform state
law process of the Conference to achieve a level of state adoption sufficient to permit
notification of ratification of the treaty.33 Professor Reitz maintains that this approach is
preferable to federal legislation because it permits harmonization of treaty provisions with
surrounding state law, and that it is preferable to self-executing treaties both for that reason
and for reasons of accessibility. Moreover, he observes, in situations requiring expeditious
implementation, the uniform law process could be backed up by federal default legislation
(that would apply if state action were not secured by a prescribed date).34

28

See Curtis R. Reitz, Globalization, International Legal Developments, and Uniform
State Laws, 51 LOYOLA L. REV. 301 (2005).
29
Id. at 318. See supra text following note 14.
30
See id. at 318-27.
31
See id. at 312-19.
“Hard law” proposals are proposals formulated so that, if
implemented, the precise texts of the proposals become the
law of the implementing government. ... “Soft law” proposals
are proposals set out in the form of a model law or legislative
guide, so that each implementing nation or state is free to
design its own statutory texts.
Id. at 312-13 (footnotes omitted).
32
See id. at 319-20.
33
See id. at 320-27.
34
See id. at 323-24.
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Professor Reitz asserts at the end of his article that implementation of the Hague
Convention (together with two other planned conventions) “through state legislation seems to
be the optimal course to follow,”35 noting that each of the three planned conventions “is
closely related to an existing product of the Uniform State Laws Conference,” and arguing that
“[a]s these negotiations begin, anticipation of future implementation by state legislation seems
appropriate to all three developments.”36 It is, therefore, not surprising that others associated
with the Conference have also advocated implementation of the Hague Convention through
uniform state legislation.
IV. The Extent of Federal Power and the Normative Implications of a History of State
Regulation
In order to evaluate these arguments it is useful, first, to consider the respective powers
of the federal government and the states with respect to the matters treated in the Hague
Convention, and, second, to identify and evaluate the considerations that bear on the wise use
of such powers. There can be no serious doubt about the power of Congress to enact
legislation prescribing uniform federal rules for the recognition and enforcement of foreigncountry judgments and hence no doubt at all about the validity of a treaty, whether selfexecuting or not, that has the same effect. Viewed in isolation, the power of Congress to
preempt state jurisdiction law in international cases – as by requiring state courts to entertain
cases in which jurisdiction is founded only on the parties’ choice of court agreement – is less
clear, and it thus may be less clear whether the treaty power could be used to effect the same
result. Notwithstanding changing attitudes toward federalism in domestic constitutional law,
however, legislation implementing the Hague Convention’s jurisdiction provisions would
probably pass muster as falling within Congress’ powers under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.37 The main authority for that proposition is, after all, a case decided when federalism
was a stronger brake on congressional action than it is today.38
35

Id. at 327.
Id.
37
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkrantz, Executing the Treaty
Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1867 (2005) (Congress can implement non-self-executing treaty by
legislation only if it would have independent power to legislate). A federalism objection in this
setting might in any event be academic, because consent “is a well recognized basis for the
exercise of judicial jurisdiction” that “is customarily exercised by a court even in the absence
of express statutory authority.” MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT pref. note (1968), in 77
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 219
(1968). See also Adrian Briggs, The Impact of Recent Judgments of the European Court on
English Procedural Law and Practice 5, University of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies
Working Paper No 11/2006 (April 2006) <http://www.ssrn.com/link/oxford-legalstudies.html> (“Submission to the court is a fundamental principle of jurisdictional
competence.”).
38
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
36
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Even if, however, the reach of implementing legislation were confined to the limits of
domestic legislative power, it is noteworthy that, without the aid of a treaty, Congress has
preempted state service of process law and at least some state jurisdiction law in international
cases involving foreign states.39 Moreover, in this context it may be a mistake to consider the
question of constitutional power to prescribe rules of jurisdiction for international cases in
isolation. With simultaneous bargaining on jurisdiction and judgment recognition and
enforcement now the norm in treaty making, a country acting unilaterally (i.e., in the absence

SENATE, S. Prt. 106-71, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-67 (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
8, § 302 cmt. d.
39
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2000) (codifying parts of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976). Section 1330(b) speaks only to personal jurisdiction in federal
courts. Section 1604 does not appear to require state courts to assert jurisdiction when there is
no immunity under federal law, although it clearly preempts state law authorizing personal
jurisdiction when federal law provides immunity. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
8, § 458(1) (“provided that the courts of that State would have jurisdiction over the defendant
and the subject matter of the claim if the defendant were not a foreign state”). But see
H.R.REP. NO. 94-1487, at 27 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6626 (“section
1330(b) of the bill confers personal jurisdiction over a foreign state in Federal and State courts
as to every claim for which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity”). If so, however, that
is not to deny constitutional power. “By reason of its authority over foreign commerce and
foreign relations, Congress has the undisputed power to decide, as a matter of federal law,
whether and under what circumstances foreign nations should be amenable to suit in the
United States.” Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983).
In the process of reaching compromises with delegates
from other countries, the American delegates would do
well to remember that due process is a floor and, thus, that
there is room to live above it. They might also find it easier
to accept that, when one views the United States as the relevant
territory, there is no need to insist on the availability of every
basis of jurisdiction to adjudicate found in the law of the fifty states
and/or found not to violate due process, and conversely, no need to
resist a single basis that might violate due process if asserted by
a state court. If the time comes to consider whether to adopt compromises
made at The Hague as federal law, the same perspective should ease the
burdens of those concerned about either the legal or the political problems
of federalism.
Burbank, supra note 6, at 114-15 (footnotes omitted). See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional
Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89, 124-29 (1999). The question of
congressional power to preempt state subject matter jurisdiction is analytically distinct. See,
e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J.
949 (2006).
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of a treaty) could rationally regard the regulation of jurisdiction as a necessary and proper
means to elicit desired action on judgment recognition and enforcement by other States.
That the federal government has the constitutional power to displace state law in the
territory covered by the Hague Convention does not mean that such power should be
exercised. Whether in response to the Hague Convention or to the ALI’s proposed federal
foreign-country judgment recognition and enforcement statute, one hears claims that, because
state law has dominated the American jurisdiction and judgments landscape in international
cases to date, it should continue to do so. The relationship between federal and state law in
both parts of this jurisprudential landscape is, however, more complex than these claims
acknowledge. Indeed, in neither part of the landscape does a consideration of past practice
yield a persuasive normative argument for state law to continue to play the dominant role.
In considering the normative implications of the history of foreign-country judgment
recognition and enforcement practice in the United States, it is important, first, to see that
history clearly, and, second, to take account of both the influences contributing to it and
changes in the relevant environment. As to the history, given the widespread and abiding
influence of Hilton v. Guyot,40 a realist would have to agree that, to a considerable extent,
federal law continues to rule from the graveyard of the general common law.41 Thus, the 1962
Uniform Act was not primarily a response to perceived problems of lack of uniformity. It was
instead an attempt to address difficulties encountered by those seeking recognition and
enforcement of American judgments abroad that were thought to arise from the form of
American law. The hope was that the familiarity of codified law would ease the path of
foreign courts bound to satisfy themselves that reciprocity would be accorded here.42 Of
course, the perception thirty years later that the Uniform Act had not proved adequate to that
task, among other reasons, led the United States to initiate the effort that ultimately yielded the
Hague Convention.43
40

159 U.S. 113 (1895).
See Burbank, Federal Judgments Law, supra note 4, at 1574 (Hilton “has been a
fertile source of rules, leading to the substantial measure of uniformity that was the great hope,
oft defeated, of the author of Swift v. Tyson”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 1580 (“it was ... the
existence of such uniform judge-made rules, albeit in different garb, that largely explains the
current state of recognition law”). See also Louise Ellen Teitz, The Story of Hilton: From
Gloves to Globalization, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 427, 447-48 (Kevin M. Clermont ed.,
2004).
42
See Burbank, Federal Judgments Law, supra note 4, at 1575-76; Adolph
Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Yorker Reflects on
Uniform Acts, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 369-70 (1970); Barbara Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign
Country Judgments in New York: The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 18
BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 5 (1968-69).
43
See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United
States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253,
283 (1991).
41
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Historical perspective on the law governing foreign-country judgments also requires
attention to the fact that, while federalism was taking a beating at home in diversity litigation
when federal courts ignored state common law under the authority of Swift v. Tyson,44
isolationism and arguments about state prerogatives combined to prevent the United States
from joining the Hague Conference, and thus from participating in any private international
lawmaking (including earlier conventions on the recognition and enforcement of judgments),
until 1964.45
As to the environment in which foreign-country judgment recognition and enforcement
questions arise, changes in the scope of international commerce and in the incidence of
international disputes requiring resolution prompted the United States finally to overcome
federalism objections and ratify the New York Convention (and Congress to enact
implementing legislation) for arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.46 Congress also
determined that the problems of international litigation warranted a federal response,47 and
once having joined the Hague Conference, the United States promptly ratified the Hague

44

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). This decision authorized federal courts independently to
“find” the governing rules – and thus not to follow the law as prescribed by state supreme
courts – in cases where the federal government as a whole lacked constitutional authority to
make law. It was overruled in 1938.
45
See Burbank, supra note 5, at 104, 128, 135, 138.
46
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; Pub. L. 91-368, § 1, 84 Stat. 692 (codified at 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2000)).
We maintained an isolationist position in the field of private international
law long after we had abandoned this ostrich posture in the public law area.
For example, as late as 1958 the United States delegation to the United Nations
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, because of the traditional
concern regarding federal-state relations, was under instructions not to
participate actively in formulating a convention for the recognition of foreign
arbitral awards. After the conference adopted such a convention,
the delegation recommended against our adherence thereto on the ground,
among others, that the United States lacked a sufficient domestic legal basis
for acceptance of an advanced international convention on the subject
of arbitration. This always struck me as making us out even more backward
than we were.
Richard D. Kearney, The United States and International Cooperation to Unify Private Law, 5
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (1972) (footnote omitted).
47

See Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85-906, 72 Stat. 1743 (establishing Commission and
Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure). For the work of this
commission, see Burbank, supra note 5, at 107-11.
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Service Convention and stimulated and ratified the Hague Evidence Convention, selfexecuting treaties that address some of those problems.48
In considering both the history and changed circumstances of foreign-country
judgment recognition and enforcement practice in the United States, it is worth recalling that
the framers (and ratifiers) of the Constitution believed that federal control of interstate
judgment recognition and enforcement practice was important to the development of an
efficient national economy. Almost two hundred years later, those responsible for the Brussels
Convention came to a similar conclusion about the importance of uniform (jurisdiction and)
judgment recognition standards to the European Economic Community/European Union.49 In
this light, and now that the United States, no longer isolated (at least commercially), seeks to
compete in a global economy, the normative case for federal leadership in international
judgment recognition and enforcement practice would appear at least as strong today as was
the case for federal control of interstate practice in 1787. In particular, the interests of U.S.
participants in the global marketplace would be well served by uniform international standards
for the recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments in other nations and of foreign-country
judgments in the United States.
Realism, historical perspective, and attention to changed circumstances are also useful
when considering the respective roles of state and federal law in prescribing jurisdiction
standards for international cases. Moreover, here too it is helpful to assess federalism claims
with attention to wholly domestic cases. Doing so reveals that direct federal constitutional
control of state law was for many years an impediment to the development of jurisdiction
standards adequate to the needs of a changing society, and in particular of a national
economy.50 Since 1945, however, federal constitutional law has been the prime legal engine of
change, prompting some state courts simply to ignore statutory language that would restrict
jurisdictional reach permitted by due process, and some state legislatures explicitly to link
state to federal constitutional law.51

48

See Burbank, supra note 5, at 129-35.
Those who framed the Brussels Convention realized, as
did the framers of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution, that civil courts can be instruments
of economic warfare and, conversely, that shared judgment
recognition standards can be powerful facilitators of economic
cooperation and integration.
Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 4, at 204 (footnotes omitted).
50
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241.
51
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Burbank, Jurisdictional
Equilibration, supra note 4, at 210; Burbank, supra note 6, at 113-14, 118: Stephen B.
Burbank, All the World His Stage (book review), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 741, 744-45 (2004).
49
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The transformation of due process from a jurisdictional floor into a bed has not been
costless in domestic cases. Moreover, the same incentives and dilemmas that incline states to
race to the bottom in the domestic dispute resolution market also operate in the global dispute
resolution market that brings the world into our courts.52 Direct federal constitutional control
of the states’ reactions to those incentives may be adequate to ensure the “great care and
reserve” that, the Supreme Court has told us, is necessary in exercising jurisdiction in
international cases generally.53 The question, however, is whether such federal power in
reserve is adequate for the purpose of devising a credible and efficient system to ensure that
we honor an international agreement in which jurisdiction is the critical quid for a recognition
and enforcement quo.
V. The Form and Content of Implementing Law
I assume that there is no serious interest in putting to the test the domestic
constitutional question, noted by Professor Reitz, whether implementation of the Hague
Convention could be left to some process of choice by the states.54 I also assume consensus on
the proposition that both the utility of the Hague Convention standing alone and its utility as a
prelude to renewed negotiations for a more inclusive treaty55 depend to a considerable extent,
both here and abroad, on its effectiveness within most if not all of the states of the United
States. On those assumptions the choice of both the means of implementation and the
supplementary rules to use as implementing law turns on an assessment of the respective costs
and benefits of (1) uniform federal law and (2) state law operating under federal control.
So defined the problem is analytically similar to that of determining the source of rules
for judge-made law in areas of federal lawmaking competence. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins56
ushered in a period of uncritical exuberance for a species of federal common law that was
consistent with a newly discovered attention to state lawmaking prerogatives – during which
the Supreme Court leaped both from a conclusion of federal lawmaking competence to that of
52

See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration:
Paths to a Via Media?, 26 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 385, 393 (2004).
53
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
54
See supra text accompanying note 29.
Some proposed “federal-state clauses” would permit a federal state
to leave implementation to its constituent units, incurring no violation
of international obligation if implementation fails. Even without a
special provision, a federal state may leave implementation of its
international obligations to its constituent units, but the central
government remains responsible if the obligation is not fulfilled.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 302 rptrs. note 4. See id. § 321 cmt. b.
55
See Burbank, supra note 52, at 403; Ronald A. Brand, Current Problems, Common
Ground, and First Principles: Restructuring the Preliminary Draft Convention Text, in A
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at 75, 77.
56
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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federal judicial lawmaking competence and from the latter conclusion to uniform federal
judge-made rules.57 In due time, however, the Court began to look critically at appeals for
uniformity and, particularly in areas implicating reliance on state law for abutting or
intersecting norms, to “borrow” state law as federal law.58 On issues lacking a persuasive case
for uniformity and/or portending the disruption of expectations founded on state law, this
approach prefers ex post policing of aspects of borrowed state law that are hostile to or
inconsistent with federal interests to ex ante specification of uniform federal rules.
Professor Reitz’s main concern relates to what he calls “international private law,”
rather than private international law -- to substantive law rather than the law of procedure.59 It
is therefore not apparent why he lumped the putative Hague Convention with efforts to
conclude treaties on matters of substantive law.60 For, it is not difficult to imagine the
confusion and disruption of legitimate expectations that could flow from superimposing
federal (i.e., treaty) substantive law norms for international cases on domestic state law that
would otherwise govern such matters.61 Uniformly federal jurisdiction and judgment
recognition and enforcement law for international cases would not usually seem to present a
comparable problem. Nor does the existence of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act, presumably the “existing product of the Uniform State Laws
Conference” to which Professor Reitz refers in connection with the Hague Convention,62
implicate the kind of planning or reliance interests that ground his justifiable concern.
57

See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Stephen B.
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A
General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 758 (1986).
58
See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Burbank, supra
note 57, at 758.
59
See Reitz, supra note 28, at 303 n.7, 304-05.
60
See id. at 327; supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
61
Conventions that provide substantive laws, even when restricted
in scope by an internationality factor, may nonetheless fit uncomfortably
alongside domestic laws. If internationality is established merely by
international diversity of residence or citizenship of parties to transactions
or events, the conventions may fall on the domestic side or on the
international side by virtue of facts that were not perceived as having
major legal significance to the actors at the time transactions were
agreed to. The substantive content of a convention however, may
differ very significantly from the substantive content of domestic law.
Id. at 315. See id. at 316.
62
See supra text accompanying note 36. It is interesting both that the Uniform
Commissioners approved a Model Choice of Forum Act in 1968 and that their action in doing
so was described as reflecting “the thought that the Commissioners could play a useful role in
transmuting certain conventions prepared by the Hague Conference into uniform, or model,
acts.” Willis L. M. Reese, The Model Choice of Forum Act, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 292, 292
(1969). However, the relevant convention, the Convention of 25 November 1965 on the
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Professor Reitz also lumped the putative Hague Convention with other putative treaties
in arguing that the prospect of state involvement in implementation could help to shape the
negotiations, perhaps permitting a choice of “soft law” over “hard law,” and in any event of a
treaty that would not be deemed self-executing.63 In fact, however, the Hague Convention had
taken almost final shape when he wrote his article, and both the subject matter and the history
of the negotiations suggest that a quest for “soft law” would have been a non-starter. It is no
surprise that the Hague Convention looks like a self-executing treaty. The quest for uniformity
and certainty – for reciprocity -- that animated the treaty left little room for variation or
departure.
If, then, the implementation of the great bulk of the Hague Convention requires
uniform rules – and such rules present no threat to reliance interests founded on, and hence no
occasion to harmonize, surrounding law -- it is not obvious why the United States should
incur, or cause others to incur, the transaction and administrability costs of achieving that end
through uniform state law rather than federal legislation. These costs would include those
incurred in the federal specification (or approval) of the content of state law, together with the
costs of monitoring progress in the states, and, perhaps, of devising and triggering a federal
legislative default in the event of recalcitrance. They also would include the time and trouble
of securing passage of uniform legislation in the states, twenty of which do not presently
follow any version of the uniform act for foreign-country judgments, and the costs to
contracting parties and disputants, here and abroad, in figuring out what United States law is.64
Finally, some of these costs would recur if it were necessary to respond to international
developments by changing the governing law.
To require implementation by state law in these circumstances might well seem “a
mere token gesture achieved at the expense of ... economy.”65 Alternatively or in addition, it
Choice of Court, never entered into force, see
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=77, and the Model Choice of
Forum Act was withdrawn in 1975 because of its limited adoption (two states as of 1975) and
also because of “other considerations,” including constitutional concerns in light of D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See 84 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 142 (1975).
63
See Reitz, supra note 28, at 326-27.
64
See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
482 U.S. 915 (1987) (noting that the Uniform Commercial Code “is not uniform”). Domestic
accessibility should not be a problem for federal law prescribed by statute rather than selfexecuting treaty. See Burbank, supra note 5, at 131 (“More than twenty years have passed
since the United States ratified the Service Convention, and we are just now seeking to clear
up part of the mess that has been spawned in domestic litigation by ignorance of the treaty and
uncertainty as to whether and when it is binding.”) (footnote omitted).
65

Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 829 F.2d 1056, 1064 (11th Cir. 1987).
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might be regarded as another manifestation of the United States’ willingness to undermine
treaties by preferring domestic to international uniformity.66
On this view, the strongest argument for implementation of the Hague Convention by a
process that relies on state lawmaking rests on a claim that state law should govern those few
matters on which the treaty contemplates (or tolerates) disuniformity. As mentioned above,
those matters include: (1) rules for determining when a choice of court agreement covered by
the Hague Convention is “null and void,” (2) rules for determining the capacity to conclude a
choice of court agreement covered by the treaty, (3) public policy norms that would be
violated by giving effect to choice of court agreements covered by, or by recognizing and
enforcing the judgments of courts exercising jurisdiction pursuant to, the Hague Convention,
and (4) principles as to service of process and of “procedural fairness” that are deemed to be
“fundamental.”67 If a Contracting State with a non-unified legal system can make declarations
on behalf of fewer than all of the constituent states to which the treaty extends, one should also
consider whether state choice is appropriate as to those matters.68
Before considering the implications for domestic law of these few matters of choice
that the Hague Convention leaves to Contracting States, it is important to make explicit what
has thus far only been suggested: there is no necessary connection between the process used to
implement the treaty and the source of the rules to which resort is made for that purpose. A
conclusion that state law, borrowed as (or operating by grace and under the supervision of)
federal law, should govern some (or even all) of those matters would by no means entail a
conclusion that implementation should be left to state legislation, uniform or otherwise.69

66

See Burbank, supra note 5, at 135-39, 149-50. Note that prolonged delay in the
implementation of the Hague Convention should itself be considered a cost for this purpose.
See infra text accompanying note 106.
67
See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
68
See supra text accompanying notes 23-27. I doubt that the language, purposes and
drafting history of the Hague Convention would support a conclusion that such power exists.
Declarations aside, I assume agreement that the choice of a rule on translation of required
documents for purposes of Article 13(4) should be made on behalf of the United States as a
whole.
69
The likelihood that affording scope to the operation of state law on some matters
would lead to domestic choice of law questions, the potential for uniform answers to which
might best be provided by federal choice of law rules (specifying state law), may itself be an
argument against implementation through state legislation. One’s view on that question
probably depends on one’s view about which implementation process – federal legislation or
the uniform state law process – is most likely to lead to choice of law rules that best respect
both state interests and the interests of the United States. Such questions are apart from the
international choice of law questions implicated in the fact that, for instance, “law of the State”
in Article 5(1) apparently “includes the choice-of-law rules of that State as well as its rules of
internal law.” DOGAUCHI & HARTLEY, supra note 16, at 22. See Teitz, supra note 1, at 550.
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Indeed, if federal legislation is deemed necessary for any purpose in connection with
the implementation of the Hague Convention, that provides an additional argument against
partial reliance on implementation through state legislation. Overcoming congressional inertia
in matters of private international law is not easy, and if federalism values can be adequately
protected without incurring the additional and potentially very substantial costs of legislation
in the fifty states that are discussed above, it would make little sense to eschew the costminimizing strategy.
The Hague Convention appears to present the possibility of using state law to achieve
the goal, adduced by Professor Reitz, of harmonizing treaty law with surrounding state law. As
previously noted, jurisdiction and judgments law in general do not usually prompt the
concerns, such as undermining reliance interests, that animate the impulse to harmonize. The
Hague Convention is different because its sole jurisdictional basis implicates substantive
contract law, in particular the law governing the validity of, and the capacity to enter into,
contracts. The two issues warrant separate treatment for these purposes.
It is, of course, true that state law governs most domestic contracts and hence the
question whether any particular domestic contract is “null and void.” It is also true, however,
that the contract issues presented by choice of court clauses are not currently governed by
uniform state law. Indeed, recent scholarship suggests that contract issues have been widely
neglected in the choice of court clause context, with attention focused on the “conflicts issues”
– the question whether, assuming that the parties entered into a valid contract to select a
forum, it should be enforced.70 The Hague Convention leaves no room (among Contracting
States) for choice on the “conflicts issues,” specifying as the only such grounds for nonenforcement that (1) “giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or
would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seised,” and (2) “for
exceptional reasons beyond the control of the parties, the agreement cannot reasonably be

70

See William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum
and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2006). Because the “contract issues” may involve a
conflict of laws, it might be better to frame the dichotomy as one between “contract issues”
and “enforcement issues,” but I will follow Professor Woodward’s terminology. One cause of
the failure to distinguish between the “contract issues” and the “conflicts issues” may have
been the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in the M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972), which had enormous influence on federal (outside of the admiralty
context) and state law, involved a choice of court clause in a negotiated contract between
sophisticated repeat players. Cf. Woodward, supra, at 34 (choice of law clauses). For the
influence of M/S Bremen, see Comment, Recent International Agreement, 119 HARV. L. REV.
931, 936 (2006); Jason Webb Yackee, Note: A Matter of Good Form: The (Downsized) Hague
Judgments Convention and Conditions of Formal Validity for the Enforcement of Forum
Selection Agreements, 53 DUKE L.J. 1179, 1184-90 (2003).
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performed.”71 Moreover, experience in a cognate area suggests that harmonization of the law
governing choice of court clauses with general contract law might not be a good idea.
The Federal Arbitration Act provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”72 The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as requiring
that states treat arbitration clauses no differently than other contracts, or, put otherwise, as
depriving states of the power to apply special contract rules to arbitration clauses in gross or to
address perceived problems arising in specific contexts where contracts to arbitrate are
found.73 The Court’s decisions have led either to a failure of regulation or to a very small tail
wagging a very large dog.74 In the latter regard, the temptation is strong for state courts that
seek to protect “those who are predictably disadvantaged where the likelihood of such
disadvantage is plain for all to see”75 to pretend that they are faithfully applying to arbitration
clauses general contract doctrines such as unconscionability.76
This experience under the Federal Arbitration Act suggests that viewing the Hague
Convention as an opportunity to harmonize those contract issues that it leaves to domestic law
with the general law of contracts of the states of the United States might be a mistake.77
Moreover, when considered with the underdeveloped condition of the (state and federal) law
concerning contract issues presented by choice of court clauses, it inclines me to the view that
international choice of court agreements should be treated discretely. The general contract
issues are not, in any event, currently governed by uniform state law, which is another way of
saying that the strongest argument for making some use of state law in the implementation of
71

Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(c) & (d). The treaty does, however, leave
room for choice within a Contracting State that is a non-unified legal system. For the law that
should govern “public policy” questions, see infra text accompanying notes 95-98.
72
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
73
See, e.g., Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91, 492 n.9 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-12
(1984).
74
See Burbank, supra note 52, at 393-94.
75
Id. at 393.
76
In a very interesting paper, Stephen Broome uses empirical and doctrinal evidence to
argue that the California courts, while purporting to apply general unconscionability doctrine
to arbitration clauses, “routinely apply an entirely different test, requiring less of parties
seeking to avoid arbitration.” Stephen A. Broome, An Unconsionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Judiciary is Circumventing the Federal
Arbitration Act 2 (unpublished paper available from author).
77
See Kubis & Perszyk Associates, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 146 N.J. 176, 197,
680 A.2d 618, 628 (1996) (“Nor does our holding in any respect undermine the interests
served by enforcing contracts freely negotiated by responsible parties with comparable
bargaining power. We simply acknowledge that the vast majority of franchise contracts do not
fit within that category.”).
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the Hague Convention speaks more clearly to the source of rules to supplement, than it does to
the mode of implementing, the treaty.
Although the Hague Convention tolerates divergence on issues of validity among
Contracting States, and also within States having non-unified legal systems, the prospects of
achieving international uniformity through rapprochement78 are obviously greater when the
United States speaks with one voice than when it speaks with fifty. Both antecedent neglect of
the issues and the context in which they arise are evidence against an argument that the use of
federal law for this purpose would damage reliance interests or upset expectations. Together
with the absence of an existing uniform act governing the contract issues, they are also
evidence against an argument for implementation through state legislation. The goals of
certainty and accessibility also favor uniform federal rules on validity issues,79 while the
inapplicability of the Hague Convention to choice of court clauses in consumer and
employment contracts reduces the likelihood of policy conflict in selecting the rules.80
Particularly in light of (1) the considerations that favor discrete treatment of the contract issues
underlying choice of court clauses that are canvassed above, and (2) the opportunity for
parochial behavior that remitting such issues to state law for international choice of court
clauses would present,81 the case for federal law seems quite powerful. It becomes stronger
still when one considers the potential costs of federal monitoring of borrowed state validity
law.
To say that uniform federal law should govern whether a choice of court clause that
designates a U.S. court under the Hague Convention is “null and void” is not to say that the
federal legislation so providing would or should seek to do so at a high level of specificity.
Rather, the legislation should specify the circumstances in which U.S. law will be applied to
such a clause (a uniform federal choice of law rule) and the grounds upon which, viewed as a
contract, such a clause can be deemed “null and void” under U.S. law – such as lack of

78

See Burbank, supra note 52, at 403-04.
See Burbank, Federal Judgments Law, supra note 4, at 1586-87 (arguing “in favor of
checks provided by uniform federal law”). Recall that, under Articles 6 and 9, the task of
ascertaining and applying the relevant U.S. law will fall to the courts of other Contracting
States when a U.S. court is the “chosen court.” See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
80
It is true, however, that the Hague Convention’s definition of a “consumer” is quite
narrow. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 2 (1)(a) (“a natural person acting primarily
for personal, family or household purposes”); Woodward, supra note 70, at 27. “The definition
is also certainly not coextensive with the range of adhesion contracts. A dentist buying
software for her practice is functionally no different from a ‘consumer’ when it comes to being
bound by a click-to-agree choice-of-forum clause contained within license terms that may or
may not be available in advance.” Id. at 27 n. 84.
81
An obvious opportunity for such behavior lies in manipulating choice of law doctrine
to apply domestic law, which is a reason, apart from the goal of uniformity, why federal choice
of law rules should apply. See supra note 69.
79
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assent,82 mistake, misrepresentation, fraud, and unconscionability – leaving it to the courts,
federal and state, to work out how those grounds should be formulated in the specific context
of international contracts governed by the treaty. The decisions of those courts would be
subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States. They would thus be akin to the
“conflicts issues,” the standards governing which are specified in Article 6 of the treaty, and
the state and federal court decisions applying which will raise a question of federal law subject
to the Court’s review.83
This proposal contemplates, in other words, a level of statutory specificity akin to that
which characterizes uniform acts, and it therefore contemplates a comparable degree of space
within which courts have the freedom to flesh out the specified norms. The important
differences between the two regimes are that norms specified in, and elaborated pursuant to,
federal legislation are indisputably federal, and that the Court is available to monitor
developing law and address conflicts in decisions below. It is not clear, on the other hand,
how federal monitoring of a uniform act relied on to implement the Hague Convention would
work either in theory or practice. Moreover, although the borrowed nature of (non-uniform)
state law to which federal implementing legislation might refer discrete issues would be clear,
“ex post policing” of fifty state laws, if taken seriously, would likely be more costly for
litigants and courts (including the Supreme Court) than would a regime of uniform federal
statutory norms elaborated by the Court through a few strategically timed decisions. Finally in
this aspect, since the treaty itself specifies, and federal law will therefore govern, most of the
norms to determine the “conflicts issues,”84 splitting implementing law between federal and
(borrowed) state law risks undue complexity and confusion and hence failure to “devis[e] a
credible and efficient system to ensure that we honor an international agreement in which
jurisdiction is the critical quid for a recognition and enforcement quo.”85

82

The Hague Convention provides that “an exclusive choice of court agreement must
be concluded or documented – (i) in writing; or (ii) by any other means of communication
which renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference.” Hague
Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(c). Satisfaction of these formal requirements of validity
should not foreclose a challenge to the validity of a choice of court clause predicated on a lack
of assent. See Teitz, supra note 1, at 552 (Hague Convention contains “nothing on substantive
validity”). For the relationship between the two in United States and European Union law, see
Yackee, supra note 70, at 1192-1204.
83
See supra text accompanying note 71. But see infra text accompanying note 95-98
(public policy). On the assumption that, even without any new grant of jurisdiction, most cases
governed by the Hague Convention would be within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts, I would not expect many of them to be filed, or remain, in state courts.
84
See supra note 71; infra text accompanying notes 95-98.
85
Supra text following note 53. If the source of rules for the contract issues and the
conflicts issues were separated, it seems less likely that the Court would (at last) develop an
approach to choice of court clauses that attends coherently to both, which approach might then
be applied in domestic cases. Note, however, the argument that some public policy norms
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Some of the considerations adduced in favor of uniform federal law (including federal
choice of law) for the validity issues arising in connection with choice of court clauses subject
to the Hague Convention, including the argument concerning complexity and confusion as a
result of multiple sources of rules, are equally applicable to the ground, in Articles 6 and 9 of
the treaty, that “a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement.”86 Given, however, that
(1) there is no evidence of special capacity rules for choice of court clauses in state law and no
evidence of a developed federal law of capacity to contract, and (2) the lack of capacity that
would defeat such a clause is thus likely also to defeat the contract of which it is a part, even
though treated as separate under the Hague Convention,87 there is here a plausible argument
that a different standard would unreasonably upset justifiable reliance interests.88 On this view,
the need is for federal choice of law rules specifying what State’s law applies on issues of
capacity, and, when United States law applies, what state’s law governs.
Finally in this aspect, experience shows that the other major contract law issues raised
in connection with international choice of court clauses -- questions of interpretation -concern whether they are exclusive or non-exclusive and their scope.89 Both issues are
addressed in the Hague Convention,90 and questions relating to them should therefore be
answered as a matter of uniform federal law. Uniform federal law should also govern the
should be non-uniform because derived from varying state laws. See infra text accompanying
notes 95-98.
86

It may be that lack of capacity, which is not mentioned in Article 5, is nonetheless
subsumed within the grounds on which a chosen court might deem a choice of court clause
“null and void” under that article. See DOGAUCHI & HARTLEY, supra note 16, at 22 n. 91, 28.
87

See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(d) (“an exclusive choice of court
agreement that forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the
other terms of the contract. The validity of the exclusive choice of court agreement cannot be
contested solely on the ground that the contract is not valid.”).
88
Because the relevant state law is not contained in a uniform act, and because in any
event we are now talking about only one of scores of legal issues under the Hague Convention,
almost all of which either must or should be governed by federal rules, a conclusion that state
law should be borrowed hardly entails a conclusion that implementation should come by way
of state legislation.
89

See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
454-57 (3d ed. 1996).
90
See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(b) (“a choice of court agreement which
designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one
Contracting State shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided
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remedies, if any, that are available for breach of a valid choice of court clause that is governed
by the Hague Convention.91
Turning to the other matters possibly suggesting a choice of state law, if not of
implementation through state legislation, as a normative matter it is difficult to argue that the
“fundamental principles” referred to in connection with service of process should be different
from those animating federal due process limits (i.e., adequate notice and opportunity to be
heard) to which state law is already subordinate in wholly domestic proceedings.92 As
suggested by the Supreme Court’s cautions against parochialism in Hilton v. Guyot,93
however, both due process and state law might be unreliable sources of “fundamental
principles of procedural fairness” for international purposes. Hilton itself, together with the
recent elaboration in the ALI draft statute and commentary, furnishes an appropriate starting
place for the uniform federal standards that are best calculated to avoid parochialism and hence
international friction when a foreign-country judgment is attacked on that ground.94
In the realm of “public policy,” by contrast, it seems likely that different sources of
rules are appropriate depending upon the territory in which the concept operates. When
identifying the circumstances in which a United States court that had not been chosen by the
parties could justifiably retain jurisdiction, because “giving effect to the agreement ... would be
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seised,”95 uniform federal
norms are appealing because retaining jurisdiction could create a situation of actual conflict
with another Contracting State through the simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction.96 Yet, those
91
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public policy considerations are likely to be the same as the public policy considerations that
would lead such a court to refuse to recognize and enforce the judgment of the chosen court. In
both cases they will usually be grounded in substantive law, the source of which, in this
context, will vary as between federal and state law. They are thus unlike the basic contract
doctrines that determine whether a choice of court clause is “null and void,” which can for this
purpose be federalized without substantial cost to federalism values, and the uniformity of
which is important to advance the goals of the Hague Convention. No such uniformity is
conceivable, in the United States, for the many substantive law fields in which choice of court
clauses subject to the treaty will operate. Moreover, “public policy” is a ubiquitous safety
valve in private international law that both acknowledges limits to the quest for uniformity and
lessens the incentive to manipulate other, putatively uniform, rules.97 The recently concluded
work of the ALI presents a model for statutory treatment that in some situations point to state
law.98
Even if the Hague Convention permits Contracting States to make (territorially) partial
declarations, the predictable costs, both pre-dispute and post-dispute, of declarations that were
applicable in some states of the United States and not others would be hard to justify. Surely
all concerned would be better served if the United States determined for the whole country
whether its courts would exercise jurisdiction when “there is no connection between that State
and the parties or the dispute,”99 and whether they would refuse recognition and enforcement
“if the parties were resident in the requested State, and the relationship of the parties and all

serve the nation’s interests. Indeed, the fact that federal and state
courts are currently making such decisions, and doing so
inconsistently, is one argument for legislation as the vehicle of change.
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other elements relevant to the dispute ... were connected only with the requested State.”100
Federal legislation should identify the relevant “State” for these purposes. In doing so,
attention should be paid to the fact that other countries have used the failure to fructify federal
jurisdictional power as an excuse to deny recognition to the judgments of U.S. courts.101 That
is to say, in dealing with the rest of the world, the United States should take advantage of the
greater reach of federal jurisdictional power, and the same perspective should guide these
determinations under the Hague Convention.102
Similarly (again assuming freedom to make partial declarations), in considering the
source of rules for exercising the power not to apply the Hague Convention to specific matters
in which there is a strong interest, both general considerations of certainty and accessibility
and the requirements that those matters be “clearly and precisely defined” and that the
declaration be “no broader than necessary”103 point to a uniform federal prescription rather
than state-by-state determination.104 Finally, the decision whether to extend the provisions of
the Hague Convention to the recognition and enforcement of judgments given by courts
designated in non-exclusive choice of court clauses, which Contracting States may do by
reciprocal declarations, is a fundamental choice, arguably as significant as the decision
whether to ratify the treaty, appropriate only for federal action.105
VI. Conclusion
Federalism is important in the United States. It is also important that the United States
be able to participate effectively in a global economy and that those charged with the conduct
of the country’s foreign affairs be able to make, and that the country abide by, international
agreements that are designed to facilitate transnational commercial activity. The Hague
Convention is one such agreement, the modest fruits of more than a decade of work in an
international lawmaking effort that was initiated by the United States. However modest the
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fruits of the enterprise, the rest of the world is watching to see whether the United States
ratifies, and how it implements, the Hague Convention.106
Effective dispute resolution processes are critical to a well-functioning global economy,
and effectiveness for this purpose requires, just as it does for a national or regional economy,
generous recognition and enforcement of judgments. Key to such generosity, in turn, are
acceptable jurisdiction standards and, experience has demonstrated, reciprocity. Finally,
mutual assurance that reciprocity will in fact be forthcoming requires very considerable
uniformity and certainty in the governing legal rules.
The Hague Convention leaves little room for variation or departure in standards for
asserting jurisdiction or recognizing and enforcing judgments. Although there are good
reasons to implement the treaty through legislation, the proposal that the uniform state law
process be used for that purpose is not well considered. The history of domestic regulation
does not provide strong normative support for state law to furnish the rules for jurisdiction and
judgment recognition in international cases. Harmonization with abutting or intersecting state
law norms, which is a legitimate concern in thinking about international private lawmaking on
many subjects, is not generally a concern in connection with the law governing jurisdiction
and judgment recognition. The Hague Convention appears to be an exception to that
generalization with respect to jurisdiction, because choice of court clauses implicate contract
law. Experience in the arbitration field suggests, however, that an attempt to harmonize would
be a mistake, and the relevant state contract law is in any event underdeveloped and not
uniform. Finally, federal implementation through legislation prescribing federal law that is
mostly uniform, but a few provisions of which may borrow designated state law, would
impose lower transaction and administrability costs, with no loss of accessibility, than would
state implementation.
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